NASA flight electronics environmental stress screening survey by Marian, E. J.
L.
L
JPL PUBLICATION 83-76
NASA Flight Electronics Environmental
Stress Screen=ng Survey
Compiled by
Edward J. Marian
(_ASA-CR-173_72) _ASA ELIGf{[[ EL_CTBON[CS
_t_VZBONMENIAL STRESS $CREEt_ZNG SUL_VEY (Jet
PropulsioD Lab.) _O _ hC AOJ/M_ _ AO]
CSCL |OA
G314_
N8_-22002
Uncias
18978
December 1, 1983
hlhSA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, California 1
i
1
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19840013934 2020-03-20T23:57:27+00:00Z
JPL PUBLICATION 83-76
NASA Flight Electronics Environmental
Stress Screening Survey
Compiled by
Edward J. Marian
December 1, 1983
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, California
The research described in this publication was carried out by' the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, under contract witlq the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
5
4_
tt
fFOREWORD
Considerable testing is required on all NASA flight programs to provide
assurance that the mission objectives will be achieved. Testing is
accomplished on NASA flight hardware at all levels ranging from individual
parts to total systems. During the course of testing, failures are noted that
are attributed to, among other things, workmanshlp/manufacturing flaws, and
parts and design deficiencies.
Some of the earlier space programs that were the forerunners for "screening"
programs for environmental exposure were the unmanned spacecraft programs and,
later, the manned spacecraft programs such as Apollo. Component-level
screening for various type's of latent failures at the various NASA centers was
(and stlll is) accomplished through the environmental acceptance-testlng
process.
More recently, industry has become sensitive to envlronmental-stress screening
of electronic hardware because of Government initiatives being exercised in
the procurement cycle. In general, industry tends to view screening as a
"screen" and not a test. The Instltute of Environmental Sciences (IES)
Industry/Government Committee on Environmental Stress Screening of Electronic
Hardware (ESSEH) has defined screening as follows (see Reference I):
"A process or combination of processes for the purpose of identifying and
eliminating defective, abnormal, or marginal parts and manufacturing
defects, n
Ill
A two-year effort by the IES ESSEH committees culminated in a set of guide-
lines for environmental-stress screening that was presented in an
industry/government workshop sponsored by the IES in 1981 at San Jose,
California (see Reference I).
Industry's interests in screening relate primarily to production quantities.
and the data base developed as the basis for the IES ESSEH guidelines document
utilizes data gathered from production projects. A wide variety of parts used
in these production units are also used in NASA flight electronlc equipment,
and it would seem reasonable to expect similar types of latent failures to be
present in this NASA equipment. It also seems reasonable to apply this
industrial base of experience to NASA flight electronic equipment.
/
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This document utilizes the IES ESSEH data augmented by other available sources
of slmillar information in conjunction with NASA centers' data and presents
this information in a form that may be useful to all NASA centers in planning
and developing effective environmental-stress screens. Specifically, this
document presents information relatlve to thermal and vibration screens as the
most effective for surfacing latent failures in electronic equipment at the
component level.
IV
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ABSTRACT
This document utilizes NASA centers' data in eonJunetlon with the IES ESSEH
data augmented by other available sources of slmillar information and presents
this information in a form that may be useful to all NASA centers in planning
and developing effective envlronmental-stress screens. Speclfleally, this
document presents information relative to thermal and vibration screens as the
most effective for surfacing latent failures in eleetronle equipment at the
component level.
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i•_ I. 0 _TRODUC_J_O_
Many surveys and studies have been conducted investigating environmental-
stress screening. In most oases test data were gathered from a variety of
sources from both government and industry. The data covered many different
projects involving electronic hardware being produced in relatively large
quantities. These data are then correlated, analyzed, and used as the basis
for developing general screens for specific types of electronic equipment.
These screens are generally designed to precipitate latent workmanship defects
and manufacturing flaws. Such generally used parameters as levels, duration,
and number of cycles are independent of mission profiles, and are applied in
the production sequence prior to the hardware acceptance test.
The surveys and other literature sources used in the preparation of this
document are listed in Sectlor 5.0, References. As part of the task in
preparation of this document, NASA has been actlvely involved in the IES £SSEH
commlttees/survey. The data from the IES survey represent more state-of-the-
art technology for electronic equipment and are more indicative of current
trends than earlier surveys.
Under the auspices of the IES, a technical committee was established in 1979
to develop a guideline document which could be used as a standard by the
industry. This group has devoted two years to the collection, review and
evaluation of the different screens currently used in the industry. Actual
screening data on many programs were obtained from various disciplines of
industry. An extensive literature search of published documents on the
subject was conducted, yielding valuable insight into the heritage of many of
the screens currently used. The final report covering guidelines for parts
and assemblies was presented at the September 1981 2rid National Conference and
Workshop of the ESSEH sponsored by the IES.
The resulting guidelines from this industry study are. by necessity, general
in nature. This industry committee considered all end uses of electronic
equipment. In this respect, the industry study was very broad in scope when
compared to the NASA objective of developing an effective screen for flight
projects. NASA flight projects generally involve small quantities of a given
component (in many cases a single component per project) while the IES
industry data are based on hlgh-volume production unlts. However, many of the
guidelines developed under the industry study are relevant to the NASA
hardware. The industry guidelines have been developed from information and
statistics on state-of-the-art hardware.
= 2.0 BACKGROUND
2.1
1!
I
A review of recent literature, surveys, and screening programs associated with
environmental-stress screening of electronic hardware combined with data
obtained from a survey of the major NASA centers form the data base for
recommendations included in this document.
Quality assurance tests carry many labels, such as flight acceptance,
workmanship, and delivery test, with a common purpose - to reveal weaknesses
or defects in the equipment as a result of errors or excessive variability in
the manufacturing process. These tests are not intended to detect design
weaknesses or to demonstrate design adequacy. The survey of major NASA
centers indicates that the quality assurance tests are for the most f art
labeled "acceptance testing." All NASA centers surveyed accomplish acceptance
testing as part of their overall test program. Environmental-stress screening
per se within NASA received wider attention in the midsixtles for the Apollo
program (see Reference 2 - Apollo experience report). It was found that the
Apollo environment was so benign that acceptance tests designed to simulate
the actual flight environment were, in many cases, not severe enough to
precipitate latent defects in the equipment. These defects were escaping to
higher levels of assembly, where repair is much more costly, or appearing in
flight with consequent dangers to mission obJectlve_ and astronaut safety.
An extensive amount of experimental effort was expended to develop minimum
vib:.ation and thermal-cycling acceptance tests for the Apollo program (see
Reference 2), which were applied to all electronic equipment at the component
or "black-box" level of assembly. The exposure levels employed in
envlronmen/al-stress screenln_ were unrelated to the expected use environment
whereas hlstorically, acceptance testing has involved the application of
environmental exposures intended to simulate the flight environment. The
purpose of the acceptance test has been to ensure that the tested hardware is
capable of surviving and performing to specification in that environment. The
survey conducted for the Apollo program (see Reference 2) indlcate_ that
thermal-vacuum testing was more effective than temperature cycling in
precipitating latent failures at the component level. (It should be noted that
respondents to the IES survey (see Reference I) did not report on thermal-
vacuum testing.) The Apollo program required both thermal (cycling) and
therual-vacuum testing.
The survey of the NASA centers consisted of a series of meetings with the
appropriate individuals from the various centers. Information was gathered
from JSC, GSFC, JPL, HSFC, and LeRC. The information consisted of documents,
briefings and letters describing the particular center's approach to screen-
i_. In almost all cases, the NASA centers perform acceptance testing at the
component level. The primary purpose of these acceptance tests is to precipi-
tate latent failures that exist because of both manufacturing flaws and work-
manship defects in parts. Included in these acceptance tests are temperature-
cycling and/or thermal-vacuum testing, and random-vibratlon exposure. A con-
siderable amount of testing is accomplished on NASA flight electronic hardware
at all levels of assembly ranging from individual piece parts to total
systems.
During the course of testing, Failures are noted that are attributed to
workmanship, marginal designs, and marginal parts. These are also the more
common causes referred to most often by industry. Table I summarizes the NASA
survey for _nvironmental-stress screen lag as accomplished by each center.
The most recent industry government survey was conducted by the IES ESSEH
committee (see Reference I) and represents more state-of-the-art electronic
equipment than previous surveys. The results of the IES ESSEH survey
indicate that temperature-cycllng, random-vlbratlon, and hlgh-temperature
screens were reported as the most effective (see Figure I). Other surveys and
applicable documents reviewed (see Section 5.0) also conclude that thermal-
cycling and random-vlbratlon screens are the most effective environmental
screens for precipitating latent defects. The types of latent defects
uncovered by these screens are summarized in each of the surveys reviewed.
The IES ESSEH survey listing is shown in Table 2 as typical For more current
electronic squlpment, and Table 3 shows the results of the earlier Apollo
experience.
In general, industry employs envlronmental-stress screening on hlgh-volume
production programs of complex hardware. The mathematical models developed
for these kinds of programs indicate that envlronmental-stress screening can
be cost-effectlve. These models may be extended to a single system such as is
the case for many NASA Flight projects; however, it is not evident based on
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Ftsure 1. Effectiveness of Environmental Screens. (Ref. 1)
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Table 2. Actual Causes of Failure by Screening Environment -- ESSEH Study (All Assembly Levels). (Ref. 1)
THERMAL CYCLING
ONLY
Drift
PC board opens, shorts
Harness termination
Part incorrectly installed
Wrong part
Hermetic seal failure
Contamination. chemical
VIBRATION ONLY
Particle contamination
Chafed. pinched wires
Crystals. internal
Mixer assemblies, internal
Adjacent boards rubbing
Two parts shorting
Loose wire
Part not bonded down
Part came loose
BOTH THERMAL CYCLING
AND VIBRATION
Solder joints
Loose hardware
Defective components
Fasteners
Table 3. Actual Causes of Failures by Screening Environment -- Apollo Experience'.
THERMAL CYCLING ONLY
Material between relay contacts (C)
Premature time delay
Broken or nicked w/re (C)
Damaged Terminal
Broken wire (C)
Damaged wire insulation
Broken resistor
Gear binding
Damaged transistor
Poor lead routing
Improper resistor selection
Bad splice (C)
Bad crimp (C)
Broken wire in potting
VIBRATION ONLY
Wind-up mechanism misalignment
Defective module (C)
Chip on rf contact
Connector backed off
Uncured epoxy
Wire improperly soldered (C)
Dewetted solder Joint
No solder on Joint (C)
Intermittently open capacitor (C)
Potting defect-glass fractured
Open relay toll (C)
Improper connector pin
Intermltten t. relay
BOTH THERMAL CYCLING
AND VIBRATION
Contamination
Lead broken
Relay contamination
(C) - Candidate failure mechanisms for detection with either vibration or thermal cycling.
* Source..
NASA TN D-8271 APOLLO Experience Report Environmental Acceptance Testing, Charles H.M.
Laubaeh, Lyndon B. Jolmacm Space Center, Houston, Texas 770S8, June 15F78.
tha industry data that this would necessarily be cost-effective. Each NASA
project would need to be reviewed on its own merits to determine the cost-
effectiveness aspect. (See Reference 3.0)
2.2 Themal
The NASA survey data for thermal considerations as shown in Table I is
summarized in Figures 2 through #. Figure 2 shows that the temperature range
typically applied to projects varies from a _T of 60°C to a_T of I00°C.
Figure 3 shows a thermal cycling variation from I to as many as 10 cycles.
Figure q shows a comparison of Pate of change of temperature with 5oc/mln
being the most widely used. It should be pointed out that the project
missions are considerably different from one another (i.e., interplanetary
versus earth orbiting) and as such it is reasonable for a wide variation to
occur. The past NASA experience record (see Reference 4) reflects that since
1975 NASA is achievlng a high overall mission effectiveness, which could lead
one to conclude that the screens presently being employed at the various NASA
centers to date appear adequate. However, in the future, the concern is
related principally to today's state-clothe-art electronics (i.e., LSI, VI.SI)
and packaging coupled with the long design llfe expected for future spacecraft
and the impact on future missions of latent failures which could result in
high life-cycle costs due to increased replenishment requirements.
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Therefore, the industry data base as shown in the IES ESSEH survey might be
reviewed for future missions that incorporate more advanced electronics.
The IES BSSEH survey data (see Reference 1) for thermal considerations is
shown in Figures 5 through 7. Figure 5 shows that the temperature ranges as
applied to specific equipment items vary from a AT of 50°C to a AT of
140o_ Figure 6 shows the typical profile used for thermal cycling and Figure
7 shows the percent fallout of latent defects versus number of thermal cycles
applied.
The survey shown in the Navy manufacturing screening program (Reference 5)
refers to data on electronic equipment that provides a correlation between
equipment complexity (i.e., number of parts within the component) and number
of thermal cycles. The IES ESSER survey attempted a slmiliar effort and that
data showed there was no correlation between number of parts in a component
versus number of thermal cycles applied and number of failures.
2.3 Vibration
Table 4 and Figure 8 summarize the NASA centers' random-vlbratlon
characteristics and power spectral densities (PSD) utilized for acceptance
testing. The data correlates to the NASA survey shown in Table 1. The PSD
level in g2/Hz varies from approximately .02 to .07. The frequency range for
the flat portion of the spectrum ranges from approximately 80 Hz to 800 Hz.
The time durations for the applied random-vibration environment varied from 1
minute per axis to 3 minutes per axis with 1 minute being used by most NASA
13
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Table 4. TYPICALVIBRATIONACCEPTANCESPECIFICATIONS
FORNASAINSTALLATIONS
_ n
NASA OVERALL FREQUENCY VIBRATION NUr_ERS
PROJECT DURATION OF REMARKS
CENTER G-_IS _NGE TIIIE(MIN,) ,_bXES
JPL GALI_O 6,6 20-2000 1 3
MSFC SHUTTIF 5,0 20-2000 3 3
SHUTTLE 6,1 20-2000 1 3
JSC APOLLO
GSFC RIU 16.7 20-2000 i 3
LEWIS CENTAUR 8,0 20-2000 i 3 SINESWEPTAND
RANDOMC_._INED
NOINPUTFROHLRCORAPES.
t i
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centers. Figure 9 shows the Apollo random-vibration screen applied to
component level electronic equipment. The same spectrum is used in the Navy
screening program (see Reference 5).
The Orumman Report (see Reference 6) on Investigation to Determine Effective
Equipment Environmental Acceptance Test Methods shows results of vibration-
testing experiments in precipitating latent defects in electronic equipment.
Figure 10 shows the typical curve of percent fallout of failures for an
applied random-vibration spectrum of 6 g's rms. The shapes of the various
curves for different kinds of implanted latent defects shown in the Reference
6 report for random-vibration excitation are similar to those shown in Figure
7 from the IES survey in that the "knee" of the curve occurs at around 5 to 10
minutes. Both surveys indicate that random vibration is effective in
precipitating latent defects in electronic equipment at a level of about .04
g2/Hz.
The YES ESSKH survey data (Heference 1) for random vibration PSDs showed a
wide variation (.01 to 0.1 g2/Hz) with the majority of the spectrums similar
to the NAVHAT P-9492 spectrum (see Reference 5), as shown in Figure 9.
18
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3.0 RECO_4ENDATIONS
3.1 General
Based on available data from both government and industry (see Section 3.0 and
References in Section 5.0), it seems reasonable that screening tests for NASA
fllght electronic equipment components include thermal cycling and random
vibration. The purpose of these tests should be to discover latent failures
due to manufacturing flaws and defects in both parts and workmanship in order
_o permit corrective action prior to integrating the component into the next
level of assembly where discovery of these latent defects would incur more
cost for correction.
The suggested envlronmental-stress screening information provided in this
document may be helpful In developing minimum requirements for thermal and
random vibration. The data shown in Figures 7 and 10 have been replotted on
one page (Figure 11) to make the point that the industry experience for
catching 70_ of the potential latent manufacturing and workmanship defects
suggests 7 thermal cycles and a vibration time of 10 minutes as a
benchmark. These suggested exposures (or those selected within the limits
indicated) for envlronmental-stress screening may be less or more severe than
those required to simulate the flight environment. If they are more severe.
they should be considered as possible minimum acceptance requirements and
govern the resultant specification.
21
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b_
Figure 7 in Section 2.2 shows the _ fallout of latent defects versus number of
thermal cycles applied. The empirical data for thermal cycling indicates that
the more thermal cycles applied the higher percent of the number of possible
failures will be found. Again, 5 to 10 thermal cycles might be considered
appropriate based on this data. The data for temperature extremes and
associated rate of change of temperature indicates -50°C to +50°C and 5°/rain
may be appropriate.
Figure 10 in Section 2.3 shows the _ failure versus duration for a random-
vibration spectrum of 6 g rms. Empirical data indicates that th_ longer the
duration the higher percent of the number of possible failures will be found.
Again, 5 to 10 minutes might be considered appropriate based on thls data.
These time durations are in excess of those used by the NASA centers.
However, selection of higher screening levels based on mission requirements
may Justify shorter screening durations. The vibration levels and durations
should be used in each of three orthogonal axes, unless there is strong
evidence that responses are essentlallF nonexistent In a particular axis, then
a lesser number of axes might be appropriate.
The recommendations for both thermal alnd vibration considerations are general
and provide a reference for planning project stress screening requirements.
As an example, The Shuttle Program has developed a NASA handbook for the
Shuttle's unique needs and would not necessarily utilize recommendations from
this document.
23
3.2 Thermal
1
Recommendations for thermal considerations are provided in Table 5. As
suggested in Section 3.0, these recommendations may provide a basis rot plan-
ning and establishing specific project environmental-stress screening require-
ments as appropriate.
3.3
Based on the finding of this survey (see References 11 2, and 6) as described
in Section 2.1, a random-vibration screen appears to be the most effective
vibration screen for the component (black-box) level. Figure 12 provides an
envelope of the flat portion of the power spectral densities (PSD) most
commonly used as reported in • surveys and documents (see References)
reviewed.
Levels outside of this envelope were reported and were generally related to
project or mission unique requirements. This may be true tn many future NASA
projects, and selected random-vibration levels may not be within the st_gested
envelope.
2_
Temperature
Cycling:
Temperature
Range:
Temperature
Rate of Change:
Equipment
Operation:
Failure
Criteria:
TABLE 5. THERMAL CONSIDERATIONS
o Figure 7 provides a summary of % failures vs. no.
thermal cycles. This information in conjunction
with the curves shown in ref. 6 should prove helpful
in determining thermal cycling requirements.
o As shown in Section 2.2 the temperature range varied
widely from within the NASA community as well as
within industry. A suggested minimum range from the
IES survey is about a &T of I00OC. The high
and low ends should be selected based on Project
requirements.
o Most programs surveyed utilized 5°C/min. The
variation went from approximately 1OC/min to
10°C/min. The general consensus was that a
faster rate of change provided the best screening.
However, this is not clearly substantiated.
o Figure 6 (reproduced from the IES survey, ref. I)
shows a typical temperature profile for component
level screening where the temperature is the test
chamber temperature and the duration was an average
of those programs surveyed.
o The results from the surveys reviewed suggest that
the equipment be operated (power-on) during thermal
cycling. References I and 5 provide suggestions
and rationale for when turn-on should occur ant
possible on-off cycling in addition.
o If the screen is applied as a true screen (per IES
definition) then a pass/fail criterion is not
necessary. However, where the "screen" is a part
of the acceptance test a retest requirement may be
appropriate upon determination of the particular
failure.
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Because there is such a wide range in opinion and definition of stress
screening, the following definitions are provided for clarification.
Exception may be taken to these definitions, but for the purpose of
clarification, they represent the flavor of the terms used in this
document.
#.1 AccePtance Te_ts
Acceptance tests are the required formal tests conducted to
demonstrate acceptability of an item for delivery. They are
intended to demonstrate performance to operational requirements and
to act as quality-control screens to detect deficiencies of
workmanship, material, and quality.
#.2
A component Is a functional unit that Is viewed as an entity for
purposes of analysis, manufacturing, maintenance, or record keeping
as stand-alone, or is an element in a system or subsystem.
Equivalent terms include, but are not limited to: black box, line
replaceable unit (LRU), unit, and assembly.
x*
4.3
A process or combination of prooesses for the purpose of
identif_ing and eliminating defective, abnormal, or marginal parts
and manufacturir_ defects.
4.4
A system is an assembly o1" two or more functionally related
subsystems.
4.5
A subsystem is an assembly of two or more funottonally related
components.
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